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Abstract
This work initiates an analysis of several cryptographic protocols from
a rational point of view using a game-theoretical approach, which allows
us to represent not only the protocols but also possible misbehaviours
of parties. Concretely, several concepts of two-person games and of two-
party cryptographic protocols are here combined in order to model the
latters as the formers. One of the main advantages of analysing a crypto-
graphic protocol in the game-theory setting is the possibility of describing
improved and stronger cryptographic solutions because possible adver-
sarial behaviours may be taken into account directly. With those tools,
protocols can be studied in a malicious model in order to find equilibrium
conditions that make possible to protect honest parties against all possible
strategies of adversaries.
Keywords: Cryptography, Game theory, Protocols verification
1 Introduction
The verification of cryptographic protocols has become a subject of great im-
portance with the development of communications and transactions on public
channels like Internet. Since Cryptology may be seen as a continuous struggle
between cryptographers and cryptanalysts, and Game Theory may be defined
as the study of decision making in difficult situations, both fields seem to have
certain common scenarios, so it is natural that tools from one area may be ap-
plied in the other. In fact, the main objective of this work is to model several
two-party cryptographic protocols as two-person games in order to introduce
the human factor in the analysis of cryptographic protocols so that it might be
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helpful to solve many security problems which are hard to deal with traditional
security primitives.
One of the first approaches that analyses the relationship between crypto-
graphic protocols and games may be found in [1], where an application of game
theoretic techniques to the analysis of some multiparty cryptographic protocols
for secret exchange was provided. Later, a solution to the problem of determin-
ing the existence of two-person games whose payoffs are comparable to those
obtained when a Third Trusted Party intervenes was proposed in [2]. Another
two recent applications of modern cryptography to game theory were presented
respectively in [3], where it was proved that every correlated equilibrium of an
original infinitely repeated game can be implemented through public commu-
nication only, and in [4], where cryptographic primitives were used to provide
correctness and privacy in distributed mechanisms.
Several cryptographic proofs of protocols correctness based on basic fairness
were provided in [5], whereas in [6] various formal definitions of different versions
of fairness were given. The idea of using game theory as a formal tool to
model specific cryptographic protocols such as Fair and Safe Exchange, and
Contract Signing was explored in the recent works [7], [8] and [9]. The concept of
rational exchange in terms of Nash equilibrium was defined in [10], where it was
proved that fair exchange implies rational exchange but not the reverse. Another
remarkable reference, [11], described a formal security model for fair signature
exchange in terms of games where fairness was defined in a probabilistic way.
Finally, the work [12] should be singled out as the main starting point of this
work since there the concept of rationality applied to exchange was introduced.
Such a reference also showed the close relationship between the rationality con-
cept and the stimulation for cooperation in ad-hoc networks.
This paper represents a preliminary step of a game-based analysis of general
scenarios and different types of two-party cryptographic protocols. Concretely,
here the modelling of incentives in the games and desirable conditions of the
protocols are described. The structure of the present work is as follows. Section
2 introduces briefly notations and definitions of several game theoretic notions
that are used throughout the paper. Then Section 3 provides a basic background
on two-party cryptographic protocols. In Sections 4 and 5 a theoretic game
model is used to describe and analyse respectively symmetric and asymmetric
two-party protocols. Finally, conclusions of the work and comments on further
investigation are drawn in Section 6.
2 Notations and Definitions
If a group P of parties or players i agree to obey certain rules and to act individ-
ually or in coalition, the results of their joint action lead to certain situations
called outcomes. In such conditions, a game G defines the set of rules that
specify a sequence of actions aǫQ allowed to the parties.
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Concretely, the rules of the game specify what amount of information about
all the previous actions and the alternatives that have been chosen can be given
to each party before making an specific choice. The game also specifies a termi-
nation when some specific sequences of choices are made and no more actions
are allowed. Each termination produces an outcome in the form of scores or
incomes y+, and payments or expenses y− for each party. It is assumed that
each party i has a preference relation ≤i over the outcomes reflected in his/her
scores and payments.
A finite action sequence q is said to be terminal if it is infinite or if there is
no action a such that q is followed by a. The set Z of terminal action sequences
represents all the possible outcomes of the game. The real-valued function
y(q) = (yi(q))iǫP that assigns the payoffs for every party i after every terminal
action sequence qǫZ is called outcome or payoff function. These payoff values
may be negative, in which case they are interpreted as losses. Also these payoffs
may verify that
∑
i∈P yi(q) = 0 for any q ∈ Z, in which case the game is called
zero-sum.
The preference relations of the parties are often represented in terms of their
payoffs in such a way that for any q, q′ǫZ and iǫP , q ≤i q′ iff yi(q) ≤ yi(q′).
On the other hand, the so called utility function ui is just a mathematical
representation of i’s preferences.
A strategy of party iǫP is a function siǫSi that assigns an action which is
available after q for party i, to every non-terminal action sequence qǫQ\Z such
that i is the following party in choosing an action after q. A strategy profile is
a vector (si)i∈P of strategies, where each si is a member of Si. The notation
(sj , (si)iǫP\j) is used to emphasise that the strategy profile specifies strategy sj
for party j. Finally, let o((si)iǫP ) denote the resulting outcome when the parties
follow the strategies in the strategy profile (si)iǫP .
A strategy profile (s∗i)iǫP is called a Nash equilibrium iff for every party
jǫP we have that o(sj , (s
∗
i )iǫP\j) ≤j o(s
∗
j , (s
∗
i )iǫP\j). This means that if every
party i other than j follows strategy s∗i , then party j is also motivated to follow
strategy s∗j . So, in Nash equilibrium the choices depend on the other’s possible
strategies.
3 Cryptographic Protocols Concepts
A two-party cryptographic protocol may be defined as the specification of an
agreed set of rules on the computations and communications that need to be per-
formed by two entities, A (Alice) and B (Bob), over a communication network,
in order to accomplish some mutually desirable goal, which is usually some-
thing more than simple secrecy. Several essential properties of cryptographic
protocols are the following:
1. Correctness, which guarantees that every honest party should get his/her
agreed output.
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2. Privacy, which includes the protection of every party’ secrets.
3. Fairness, which means that if a dishonest party exists, then neither he/she
may gain anything valuable, nor honest party may lose anything valuable.
In the game-theoretic model two new properties regarding dishonest be-
haviours can be defined
1. Exclusiveness, which implies that one or both parties cannot receive their
agreed output.
2. Voyeurism, which is the contrary of privacy because it implies that one or
both parties may discover the other’s secret.
Note that the previous definition of fairness agrees with the rationality con-
cept described in [10] because fairness here is a property which is understood
more practical than theoretical. In other words, protocols are here defined ac-
cording to their practical security against any kind of adversaries.
It is assumed that at each step a party receives the message that was sent
by the other party at the previous step, performs some private computation
and sends some message (possibly none) to the other party. So, a two-party
cryptographic protocol may be seen as a repeated game formed by a sequence
of iterations of the following two communication phases:
1)Send: Party A (B) sends to B (A) a message M generated depending on
her (his) state.
2)Receive: Party A (B) receives from B (A) a messageM and makes a state
transition.
Thus, we are implicitly assuming that the system is synchronous (parties
know the time and must decide what message to send in each round before re-
ceiving any message sent to them in that round), communication is guaranteed,
and messages take exactly one round to arrive. These assumptions are critical
to the correctness of the protocols. Also, for the sake of simplicity, in this paper
the non-intentional loss of control over message M is considered as a delivery,
so rcvA(M) (rcvB(M)) denotes both the cases when party B(A) sends message
M to A(B), and when A(B) is able to receive it.
In order to formalise the notion of cryptographic protocols in terms of func-
tions, we denote by f a two-argument finite function, f : XA ×XB → YA × YB
whereXi and Yi, iǫ{A,B}, represent respectively input and output sets for party
i. Intuitively, a two-party cryptographic protocol may be generally described
through a two-variable function f whose output is defined by the expression
f(MA,MB) = (fA(MA,MB), fB(MA,MB)), where it is understood that party
i receives the output of fi on inputs MA and MB.
As aforementioned, two-party cryptographic protocols include a series of
message exchanges between both parties over a communication network. So,
the possibility always exists that one or both parties will cheat to gain some
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advantage or that some external agent will interfere with normal communica-
tions. The simplest situation occurs when each party functions asynchronously
from the other party and makes inferences by combining a priori knowledge with
properties of the received messages, determining information that is not imme-
diately apparent, so such inferences must be taken into account in determining
security. In a worst case analysis of a protocol, one must assume that any party
may try to subvert the protocol. So, when designing a two-party cryptographic
protocol one of two possible models should be considered:
• Semi-honest model: When it is assumed that the protocol is cooperative
and both parties follow the protocol properly in such a way that they help
each other to compute fi(MA,MB), but curious parties may keep a record
of all the information received during the execution and use it to make a
later attack.
• Malicious model: Where it is assumed that parties may deviate from
the protocol. In this case, during the interaction, each party acts non
cooperatively and has different choices which may determine the output
of the protocol.
We are interested in obtaining guarantees provided by the definition of the
protocols when one of both parties misbehaves in an arbitrary way. Conse-
quently, this work is conducted within the malicious model where it is assumed
that either A or B does not follow the protocol properly. In such a model the se-
curity of a cryptographic protocol should refer to its ability to withstand attacks
by certain types of cheaters or enemies, in such a way that essential properties
such as correctness, privacy and fairness hold despite such possible attacks. So,
the main interest of this work will be the description of honest strategy profiles
for every analysed protocol such that whenever the strategy of some party is
honest, the other party has no incentive to deviate from the protocol, which is
closely related to Nash equilibrium conditions.
Apparently, any two-party cryptographic protocols might be best modelled
with a zero-sum game because every situation that is dishonestly advantageous
for a party should be disadvantageous for the other. In fact this is not the
case of many protocols. In general, most two-party cryptographic protocols are
represented by non-positive sum games (i.e. games in which the sum of the
payoffs of the players is always less than or equal to 0). Those games in which
the sum of the payoffs can be positive should be generally discarded because
they imply that both parties could agree on behaving dishonestly and receive
positive payoffs.
In particular, the payoff yi(q) of a party i, assigned after a terminal action
sequence q may defined as yi(q) = y
+
i(q) − y
−
i(q), where y
+
i(q) and y
−
i(q)
represent respectively the incomes and expenses of i after q. These incomes and
expenses functions will be defined in terms of utilities according to the concrete
definitions of each protocol. Here the utility that a secretMj is worth to party i
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is denoted by uij = ui(Mj), value which may be difficult to quantify in practical
situations.
A two-party cryptographic protocol is said to be closed when if a party gains
something, then the other party must lose something. This property may be
expressed in terms of the incomes and expenses functions in the following way:
∀qǫZ, y+i(q) > 0 ⇒ y
−
j(q) > 0. Note that in this work the closeness of the
protocols is assumed since in the definition of the payoff function we always
consider both the wish of one party to know the other’s secret and the wish of
the other party to prevent that from happening.
According to the aforementioned functional definition of a two-party crypto-
graphic protocol f , at the end of the execution, party i should receive the output
of fi on secrets MA and MB. Depending on whether fA = fB we may distin-
guish between symmetric and asymmetric protocols. From the first group, in the
next sections we will study the protocols of Fair Exchange, Secure Two-Party
Computation and Coin Flipping. On the other hand, representative protocols
of the group of asymmetric protocols are Oblivious Transfer, Bit Commitment
and Zero Knowledge Proof. This classification is important for the proposed
game theoretic model because it implies the translation to a symmetric game
where possible payoffs and outputs of both parties coincide, or to asymmetric
games where that does not occur.
In the following sections several symmetric and asymmetric protocols are
analysed according to a game-theoretic model. For every analysed protocol we
define income, expense and payoff functions for each party in every possible
combination of behaviours and misbehaviours of parties, and make rather min-
imal assumptions about several matters such as the preferences of the parties
in order to guarantee the existence of a honest strategy profile being a Nash
equilibrium. Although the possibility of misbehaviours by both parties is here
considered, in this paper we analyse specially the case when exactly one of them
is dishonest. Note that if this assumption is not fulfilled, there might be some
dishonest strategy that dominates the corresponding honest strategy, and in
such conditions rational parties would be consequently dishonest.
4 Symmetric Protocols
4.1 Fair Exchange
Fair Exchange is a cryptographic protocol for exchanging secrets MA and MB
between two parties A and B so that if A behaves correctly, then party B cannot
get A’s secret (MA) unless A gets B’s secret (MB), and vice versa. According
to this definition, possible descriptions of non-null values of the incomes and
expenses functions y+i and y
−
i are the following:
y+i(q) = uij if rcvi(Mj)
y−i(q) = uii if rcvj(Mi).
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Note that if no assumptions or preferences of parties are made, rational
parties will simply not send their secrets since this strategy weakly dominates
sending the secret. However, since the parties’ objective in this protocol is to
obtain each other’s secret, we are only interested in the states of the protocol
tree where A possesses B’s secret and the ones where B possesses A’s secret.
So, one property that utility uij should verify in order to avoid a possible coali-
tion between two dishonest parties is the following: uij > uii > 0, ∀i, jǫ{A,B}.
For example, such utilities might reflect the interests of both parties to partic-
ipate cooperatively if the protocol is run correctly. In this way, parties value
correctness over privacy, and the payoff yi(q) of party i can take only four pos-
sible values: −uii < 0 < uij − uii < uij corresponding respectively to the
four possible terminal action sequence when rcvj(Mi) ≤i rcvi(∅) ∧ rcvj(∅) ≤i
rcvi(Mj) ∧ rcvj(Mi) ≤i rcvi(Mj).
Fairness property ensures that if i is honest, then the other party j cannot
get i’s secret unless i gets j’s secret. So, in terms of incomes and expenses
functions we have that if i’s strategy s∗i is honest, then for every strategy of
j, sj : if y
+
j (o(s
∗
i , sj)) = uji ⇒ y
+
i (o(s
∗
i , sj)) = uij .
So, it may be stated that in a rational fair exchange protocol where both
parties have incentives to send their secrets, honest strategies are Nash equi-
librium because if one party follows a honest strategy, then the other party is
also motivated to behave honestly because he/she loses or at least does not gain
anything by not doing so.
Examples of fair exchange include Contract Signing and Certified Mail proto-
cols [13]. In the former, both parties A and B want to exchange simultaneously
signed contracts in such a way that none of them can obtain the signature of
the other without having signed the contract and that none of them can repu-
diate his or her own signature. On the other hand, in Certified Mail A wants to
send a mail MA to B so that B can read the mail MA if and only if A receives
the corresponding return receipt MB. Consequently, a conclusion similar to the
obtained for fair exchange may be extracted for both cases of contract signing
and certified mail protocols.
4.2 Secure Two-Party Computation
The general protocol known as Secure Two-Party Computation allows that two
parties A and B with secret inputs MA and MB to evaluate a common value
fA(MA,MB) = fB(MA,MB)) = g(MA,MB) = g in a manner where neither
party learns more than necessary. This protocol is the two-party version of the
multiparty protocol known as Secure Function Evaluation. There are various
definitions and models for Secure Two-Party Computation [14] and indeed the
above definition describes just one of them. For example, one might consider
an asymmetric version where only A receives the output. However, this work
deals with this symmetric version where both parties learn the value g.
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A possible description of the incomes and expenses functions y+i and y
−
i
that verifies the previous definition is as follows, where k > 1:
y+i(q) =


uij if rcvi(Mj)
kui(g) if rcvi(g)
uij + kui(g) if rcvi(Mj , g)
0 otherwise
y−i(q) =


uii if rcvj(Mi)
ui(g)) if rcvj(g)
uii + ui(g) if rcvj(Mi, g)
0 otherwise
A serious problem of this protocol arises when there is no way to force a party
to use his/her correct input. So, according to privacy property, and in order to
avoid a possible coalition between dishonest parties, we there should be assumed
that the following inequality holds: ui(g) < uij < kui(g) < uii, ∀i, jǫA,B which
implies that: exclusiveness ≤i voyeurism ≤i correctness ≤i privacy.
If the utility of g(MA,MB) is the same for both parties, u = uA(g) =
uB(g), the payoff yi(q) of party i may take the following sixteen possible values:
−u− uii < −uii < uij − uii− u < (k− 1)u− uii < ku− uii < −u, uij − uii, (k−
1)u+ uij − uii < 0, ku+ uij − uii < uij − u < uij , (k − 1)u < ku < (k − 1)u +
uij < ku+uij corresponding respectively to the sixteen possible terminal action
sequence when rcvj(g,Mi) ≤i rcvj(Mi) ≤i rcvj(g,Mi) ∧ rcvi(Mj) ≤i rcvi(g)∧
rcvj(g,Mi) ≤i rcvj(Mi)∧rcvi(g) ≤i rcvj(g), rcvj(Mi)∧rcvi(Mj), rcvj(g,Mi)∧
rcvi(g,Mj) ≤i rcvi(∅)∧rcvj(∅), rcvi(g,Mj)∧rcvj(Mi) ≤i rcvi(Mj)∧rcvj(g) ≤i
rcvi(Mj), rcvi(g) ∧ rcvj(g) ≤i rcvi(g) ≤i rcvi(g,Mj) ∧ rcvj(g) ≤i rcvi(g,Mj).
A rational secure two-party computation protocol ensures that no party
receive the other party’s secret and that if party i is honest, then the other
party j cannot get g(MA,MB) unless i gets it. So, in terms of incomes and
expenses functions we have that if i’s strategy s∗i is honest, then for every
strategy of j, sj : if y
+
j (o(s
∗
i , sj)) = kuj(g) ⇒ y
+
i (o(s
∗
i , sj)) = kui(g), and
if y+j (o(s
∗
i , sj)) = uji + kuj(g) ⇒ y
+
i (o(s
∗
i , sj)) = uij + kui(g). So, in rational
secure two-party computation protocol, honest strategies hold Nash equilibrium
conditions.
4.3 Coin Flipping
Coin flipping protocols are used where two parties A and B want to generate
jointly a common random binary sequence M . According to this definition,
possible descriptions of non-null additive values of the incomes and expenses
functions y+i and y
−
i are the following, where k > 1:
y+i(q) = ui(M) if M is selected by i
y+i(q) = kui(M) if rcvi(M)
y−i(q) = kui(M) if M is selected by j
y−i(q) = ui(M) if rcvj(M).
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In this way, according to preferences of parties, correctness and voyeurism are
valued over exclusiveness and privacy, and the payoff yi(q) of party i can take five
possible values: −kui(M) < −ui(M) < 0 < ui(M) < kui(M) corresponding
respectively to the five possible terminal action sequence when M is selected by
j ≤i rcvj(M) ≤i rcvj(M) ∧ rcvi(M) ≤i M is selected by i ≤i rcvi(M)
Again fairness property ensures that either both parties get the agreed out-
come or neither does, so if party i is honest, then the other party j cannot get
the randomly generated sequence M before. So, in terms of incomes and ex-
penses functions we have that if i’s strategy s∗i is honest, then for every strategy
of j, sj , if y
+
j (o(s
∗
i , sj)) = kuj(M) ⇒ y
+
i (o(s
∗
i , sj)) = kui(M). Consequently,
honest strategies in rational coin flipping protocols are Nash equilibrium.
5 Asymmetric Protocols
5.1 Oblivious Transfer
A major component in the construction of Secure Two-Party Computation pro-
tocols is the Oblivious Transfer protocol since it has been proved that a Secure
Two-Party Computation can be always built using calls to an Oblivious Transfer
protocol [15]. So, the term Oblivious Transfer refers usually to several different
versions of asymmetric Secure Two-Party Computation protocols, all of which
turned out to be equivalent. However, the definition that will be used in this
work is the following. An Oblivious Transfer may be defined as a protocol whose
goal is to enable one party A to transfer a secret to another party B in such a
way that the information is transferred with a probability 1/2, and when con-
cluding the protocol B knows with absolute certainty whether he has got the
secret or not, but A does not know it.
Possible descriptions of additive incomes and expenses functions y+i and
y−i are the following, where k > 1:
y−A(q) = uA(M) and y
+
B(q) = uB(M) if rcvB(M)
y+A(q) = kuA(M) and y
−
B(M) = (k + 1)uB(M) if A knows whether
rcvB(M) or not.
If no assumption is made on A’ interest to participate in a correct protocol,
then there may be a problem because a rational party A would simply not
send her secret. Consequently, the described model implies that party A should
value voyeurism over exclusiveness, whereas party B should value privacy over
correctness. On the one hand, the payoff functions of party A can take the
following four values: −uA(M) < (k − 1)uA(M) < 0 < kuA(M) corresponding
respectively to the four possible terminal action sequence when rcvB(M) ≤i
rcvB(M) ∧ A knows it ≤i rcvB(∅) ≤i rcvB(∅) ∧ A knows it. On the other
hand, the payoff functions of party B can take the following four values: (−k−
1)uB(M) < −kuB(M) < 0 < uB(M) corresponding respectively to the four
possible terminal action sequence when rcvB(∅) ∧ A knows it ≤i rcvB(M) ∧ A
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knows it ≤i rcvB(∅) ≤i rcvB(M).
A rational oblivious transfer ensures that if party B is honest, A cannot
know whether B received the secret or not, and if party A is honest, B receives
the secret with probability 1/2. So, in terms of incomes and expenses functions
we have that if B’s strategy s∗B is honest, then for every strategy of A, sA:
if y+A(o(s
∗
B , sA)) = kuA(M) ⇒ y
+
B(o(s
∗
B , sA)) = uB(M), so sA is not a good
strategy for A. From the above it may be stated that honest strategies in
rational oblivious transfer hold Nash equilibrium conditions.
5.2 Bit Commitment
The goal pursued by this two party protocol is twofold: first A transfers infor-
mation to B that can not be changed for her (unalterability property) and such
information can not be accessed by B until the end of the protocol is reached (il-
legibility property). Originally the aforementioned information consists of only
one bit.
When defining utility function the possible frauds should be taken into ac-
count for both participants. So, in this case B would obtain the bit before
opening the commitment, A could also modify the content of the original com-
mitment while the protocol’s development. The expenses and incomes of each
participants are the following where k > 1:
y−A(q) = k · uA(M), y
+
B = uB(M), if rcvB(M)) before the opening stage
y+A(q) = uA(M), y
−
B = k · uB(M), if A modifies M
According to the previous values, the payoff for each party has the values 0,
−k · ui(M), ui(M) and (1− k) · ui(M), i ∈ {A,B}. From these utility functions
it can be deduced that the honest behaviour of party A implies B’honesty,
since the other possibilities convey non positive payoffs. Again honest strategies
have Nash equilibrium associated. Furthermore it can be deduced that party A
associate a bigger weight to privacy property than to exclusiveness. On the other
hand, B’s preferences single out correctness property compared to voyeurism.
5.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
A zero-knowledge protocol allows party A to convince B that she knows some
information but without leaking anything about the secret. The two dishonest
possibilities considered are: party A does not know the secret or party B gets
the secret, so the corresponding expenses and incomes are
y−A = k · uA(M), y
+
B = uB(M), if rcvB(M)
y+A = uA(M), y
−
B = k · uB(M) when A does not know the secret
The payoff deduced from those values are 0, ui(M) and −k · ui(M), i ∈
{A,B}. Hence, Nash’s equilibrium forces both participants to be honest. Ac-
cording to the previous model, party A should value privacy over exclusiveness
while for party B, correctness outweighs voyeurism.
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6 Conclusions
This paper addresses an emergent issue in security: the synergy between secu-
rity protocols and game theory mechanisms. In particular, the study of several
two-party protocols in a game-theoretic model is here initiated, by giving for-
mal definitions of payoffs for each party and ranking properties of exclusiveness,
voyeurism, correctness and privacy. This work deals with the idea of modelling
cryptographic protocols design as the search of an equilibrium in order to de-
fend honest parties against all possible strategies of malicious parties. So, our
first objective has been to illustrate the close connection between protocols and
games and to use game theoretic techniques for the definition and analysis of
cryptographic protocols so that this model might be used to build more effective
and efficient security protocols.
Two subjects that are being object of work in progress are the generalization
of the game-theoretic approach followed in this work to multiparty cryptographic
protocols, and the analysis of the relationship between properties like fairness
and different game theoretic concepts, such as dominant strategic equilibrium.
Finally, one direction for further investigation involves the study of the possi-
bility of describing two-party protocols as sequential games instead of repeated
games, which might be more convenient in many cases.
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